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Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness

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Resource type
Journal Article
Author/contributor
Title
Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness
Abstract
This commentary concerns the distinction between computational modelling and computational metaphysics (i.e., the Computational Theory of Mind) in the context of consciousness studies. I argue that the ability to simulate the dynamics of a phenomenon using computational models does not entail that that phenomenon is literally performing the computations that are prescribed by the model.
Publication
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Date
2026/01
Volume
49
Pages
e354
DOI
10.1017/S0140525X25103580
URL
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/abs/computational-neuroscience-versus-the-computational-theory-of-mind-why-their-difference-matters-for-the-possibility-of-artificial-consciousness/3FB1C6AB6D539D6A35CAD17C60C8BBFC
Accessed
9/28/26, 6:53 AM
ISSN
0140-525X, 1469-1825
Short Title
Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind
Language
en
Library Catalog
Cambridge University Press
Citation
Ramstead, M. J. (2026). Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49, e354. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25103580
Link to this record
http://127.0.0.1:5000/bibliography/2JWUKX6D