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The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip

Resource type
Journal Article
Authors/contributors
Title
The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip
Abstract
Abstract We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system’s states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem’s main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.
Publication
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Volume
2024
Issue
1
Pages
niae037
Date
2024-12-27
Language
en
ISSN
2057-2107
Short Title
The case for neurons
Accessed
3/21/25, 2:22 PM
Library Catalog
DOI.org (Crossref)
Citation
Kleiner, J., & Ludwig, T. (2024). The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2024(1), niae037. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niae037