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Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument

Resource type
Journal Article
Authors/contributors
Title
Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument
Abstract
Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies.
Publication
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume
23
Issue
5
Pages
1097-1118
Date
12/2024
Journal Abbr
Phenom Cogn Sci
Language
en
ISSN
1568-7759, 1572-8676
Short Title
Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity?
Accessed
3/7/25, 8:06 AM
Library Catalog
DOI.org (Crossref)
Citation
Northoff, G., & Gouveia, S. S. (2024). Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 23(5), 1097–1118. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0