Full bibliography

Metaphysical confusion and biological naturalism

Resource type
Journal Article
Author/contributor
Title
Metaphysical confusion and biological naturalism
Abstract
In his defence of biological naturalism and rejection of computational functionalism, Seth shows himself to be in the grip of dualistic intuitions. Thankfully, we can read Seth’s paper as a worthwhile contribution to the ongoing society-wide conversation on how to talk about, think about, and treat advanced AI, while setting aside the metaphysical framing of his arguments.
Publication
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Date
2026/01
Volume
49
Pages
e361
Accessed
9/28/26, 7:01 AM
ISSN
0140-525X, 1469-1825
Language
en
Library Catalog
Cambridge University Press
Citation
Shanahan, M. (2026). Metaphysical confusion and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49, e361. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25103701