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Birds do it, we do it, even embodied machines could do it. Why consciousness is not intrinsically biological.
Resource type
Journal Article
Author/contributor
- Bowes, Simon (Author)
Title
Birds do it, we do it, even embodied machines could do it. Why consciousness is not intrinsically biological.
Abstract
Digital computation may not be sufficient for consciousness, but this does not warrant biological naturalism. Rejecting coarse-grained Turing-computational functionalism and adopting a broader computationalism with no built-in syntax/semantics distinction, undermines the motivation for biological naturalism. Substrate-dependent processes of the kind found in living things may be necessary for the emergence of consciousness, but these are functional requirements, not intrinsic properties.
Publication
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Date
2026/01
Volume
49
Pages
e324
Accessed
9/28/26, 6:52 AM
ISSN
0140-525X, 1469-1825
Language
en
Library Catalog
Cambridge University Press
Citation
Bowes, S. (2026). Birds do it, we do it, even embodied machines could do it. Why consciousness is not intrinsically biological. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49, e324. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25103737
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