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In this paper, I investigate whether metacognition — the ability to monitor, evaluate, and regulate one’s own cognitive processes and performance — can arise in non-biological systems, especially Large Language Models (LLMs). Drawing on cognitive science and philosophy of mind, I contrast embodied and enactivist accounts, which tie metacognition to biological consciousness and embodied entities, with functionalist perspectives that define it as a substrate-independent process. I argue that the absence of evidence is not evidence of impossibility and propose a functional definition of metacognition based on internal representation, monitoring, and self-regulation. Recent studies on LLMs show early functional signatures of self-monitoring, suggesting the emergence of limited operational introspection. While I do not claim that artificial metacognition has been demonstrated, I advocate an epistemically open, non-anthropocentric approach. Metacognition, I conclude, should be conceived as a functionally realizable property across different substrates, evaluated by what systems do, not what they are.