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The purpose of this article is to show why consciousness and thought are not manifested in digital computers. Analyzing the rationale for claiming that the formal manipulation of physical symbols in Turing machines would emulate human thought, the article attempts to show why this proved false. This is because the reinterpretation of ‘designation’ and ‘meaning’ to accommodate physical symbol manipulation eliminated their crucial functions in human discourse. Words have denotations and intensional meanings because the brain transforms the physical stimuli received from the microworld into a qualitative, macroscopic representation for consciousness. Lacking this capacity as programmed machines, computers have no representations for their symbols to designate and mean. Unlike human beings in which consciousness and thought, with their inherent content, have emerged because of their organic natures, serial processing computers or parallel distributed processing systems, as programmed electrical machines, lack these causal capacities.

The question “What is consciousness for?” is considered with particular relevance to objects created using interactive technologies. It is argued that an understanding of artificial life with it attendant notion of robotic consciousness is not separable from an understanding of human consciousness. The positions of Daniel Dennett and John Searle are compared. Dennett believes that by understanding the process of evolutionary design we can work towards an understanding of consciousness. Searle's view is that in most cases mental attributes such as consciousness are either dispositional or are observer relative. This opposition is taken as the basis for a discussion of the purposes of consciousness in general and how these might be manifest in human and robotic forms of life.

A memory-controlled, sensor/actuator machine senses conditions in its environment at given moments, and attempts to produce an action based upon its memory. However, a sensor/actuator machine will stop producing new behavior if its environment is removed. A sensor/sensor unit can be added to the sensor/actuator machine, forming a compound machine. The sensor/sensor unit produces a stream of internally created sensed conditions, which can replace the sensed conditions from the environment. This illusion of an environment is similar to consciousness. In addition, actuator/sensor and actuator/actuator units can be added to this compound machine to further enhance its ability to function without an environment. Predetermined and empirical memory cells can be distributed throughout the control units of this compound machine to provide instinctive and learned behavior. The internal and exterior behavior of this compound machine can be modified greatly by changing the cycle start and ramp signals that activate these different kinds of memory cells. These signals are similar in form to brain waves.

The main concern of this chapter is to determine whether consciousness in robots is possible. Several reasons are illustrated why conscious robots are deemed impossible, namely: robots are purely material things, and consciousness requires immaterial mind-stuff; robots are inorganic (by definition), and consciousness can exist only in an organic brain; robots are artefacts, and consciousness abhors an artefact because only something natural, born and not manufactured, could exhibit genuine consciousness; and robots will always be much too simple to be conscious. These assumptions are considered unreasonable and inadequate by the author, thus, counter-arguments on each assumption are given. The author contends that it is more interesting to explore if a robot that is theoretically interesting, independent of the philosophical conundrum about whether it is conscious, is formable. The Cog project on a humanoid robot is, thus, comprehensively presented and examined in this chapter.

Arguments about whether a robot could ever be conscious have been conducted up to now in the factually impoverished arena of what is ‘possible in principle’. A team at MIT, of which I am a part, is now embarking on a longterm project to design and build a humanoid robot, Cog, whose cognitive talents will include speech, eye-coordinated manipulation of objects, and a host of self-protective, self-regulatory and self-exploring activities. The aim of the project is not to make a conscious robot, but to make a robot that can interact with human beings in a robust and versatile manner in real time, take care of itself, and tell its designers things about itself that would otherwise be extremely difficult if not impossible to determine by examination. Many of the details of Cog’s ‘neural’ organization will parallel what is known (or presumed known) about their counterparts in the human brain, but the intended realism of Cog as a model is relatively coarse-grained, varying opportunistically as a function of what we think we know, what we think we can build, and what we think doesn’t matter. Much of what we think will of course prove to be mistaken; that is one advantage of real experiments over thought experiments.

Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed. Homeostatic behaviour is often cited as a criterion for consciousness, but is not itself sufficient. As the present difficulties in surmounting the ‘frame problem’ show, ability to size up situations holistically is more important; so is the explanatory role of the concept. Consciousness confers evidential status: if we ascribed consciousness to an artefact, we should be prepared to believe it, when it said its RAM was hurting, even though we could detect nothing wrong, contrary to our thinking of it as an artefact. A further difficulty arises from self-awareness and reflexivity.

Mind<>Computer: Attempts to mimic human intelligence through methods of classical computing have failed because implementing basic elements of rationality has proven obstinate to the design criterion of machine intelligence. A radical definition of Consciousness describing awareness, as the dynamic representation of a noumenon comprised of three base states; and not itself fundamental as generally defined in the current reductionistic view of the standard model, which has created an intractable hard problem of consciousness as defined by Chalmers. By clarifying the definition of matter a broader ontological quantum theory removes immateriality from the Cartesian split bringing mind into the physical realm for pragmatic investigation. Evidence suggests that the brain is a naturally occurring quantum computer, but the brain not being paramount to awareness does not itself evanesce consciousness without the interaction of a nonlocal conscious process; because Mind <> computer and cannot be reduced to brain states alone. The proposed cosmology of consciousness is indicative of a teleological principle as an inherent part of a conscious universe. By applying the parameters of quantum brain dynamics to the stack of a specialized hybrid electronic optical quantum computer with a heterosoric molecular crystal core, consciousness evanesces through entrainment of the non local conscious processes. This 'extracellular containment of natural intelligence' probably represents the only viable direction for AI to simulate 'conscious computing' because true consciousness = life.

Abstract. We consider only the relationship of consciousness to physical reality, whether physical reality is interpreted as the brain, artificial intelligence, or the universe as a whole. The difficulties with starting the analysis with physical reality on the one hand and with consciousness on the other are delineated. We consider how one may derive from the other. Concepts of universal or pure consciousness versus local or ego consciousness are explored with the possibility that consciousness may be physically creative. We examine whether artificial intelligence can possess consciousness as an extension of the interrelationship between consciousness and the brain or material reality.

This paper proposes an approach to designing behavior and its subjective world of a small robot to behave like an animal. This approach employs a hierarchical model of the relation between consciousness and behavior. The basic idea of this model is that a consciousness appears on a level in the hierarchical structure when an action on an immediately lower level is inhibited for internal or external causes, and that the appearing consciousness drives a chosen higher action. The computer simulation on a Mac shows the behavior of an artificial animal from reflex actions to catching of food. Its instantaneous consciousness that appears due to inhibited behavior is visualized with the behavior on the screen with use of colors according to emotions of the animal.

For a variety of reasons, consciousness and selfhood are beginning once again to be intensively studied in a scientific frame of reference. The notions of each which are emerging are extremely varied: in the case of selfhood, the lack of an adequate vocabulary to capture various aspects of subjectivity has led to deep confusion. The task of the first part of this article is to clear up this terminological confusion, while salvaging whatever is valuable from the contemporary discussion. The more important task of the second part is to discuss the moral issues inevitably involved in any treatment, scientific or otherwise, of the modern identity.

“Oscar” is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he “will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states” (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar.

Shanon provides us with a well reasoned and careful consideration of the nature of consciousness. Shanon argues from this understanding of consciousness that machines could not be conscious. A reconsideration of Shanon's discussion of consciousness is undertaken to determine what it is that computers are missing so as to prevent them from being conscious. The conclusion is that under scrutiny it is hard to establish a priori that machines could not be conscious.

This paper is a response to Henley who criticizes a previous paper of mine arguing against my claim that computers are devoid of consciousness. While the claim regarding computers and consciousness was not the main theme of my original paper, I do, indeed, subscribe to it. Here, I review the main characteristics of human consciousness presented in the earlier paper and argue that computers cannot exhibit them. Any ascription of these characteristics to computers is superficial and misleading in that it fails to capture essential, intrinsic features of human cognition. More generally, psychological theory couched in terms of semantic representations and the computational operations associated with them is bound to be inadequate. The phenomenology of consciousness is a specific case marking this inadequacy.