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This paper discusses recent research on humanoid robots and thought experiments addressing the question to what degree such robots could be expected to develop human-like cognition, if rather than being preprogrammed they were made to learn from the interaction with their physical and social environment like human infants. A question of particular interest, from both a semiotic and a cognitive scientific perspective, is whether or not such robots could develop an experiential Umwelt, i.e. could the sign processes they are involved in become intrinsically meaningful to themselves? Arguments for and against the possibility of phenomenal artificial minds of different forms are discussed, and it is concluded that humanoid robotics still has to be considered “weak” rather than “strong AI”, i.e. it deals with models of mind rather than actual minds.

In 1994 John Searle stated (Searle 1994: 11-12) that the Chinese Room Argument (CRA) is an attempt to prove the truth of the premise: led him to the conclusion that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that computationalism, the idea that the essence of thinking lies in computational processes and that such processes thereby underlie and explain conscious thinking, is false. The argument presented in this chapter is not a direct attack or defence of the CRA, but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.1 However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this chapter will explore the associated link between syntax and physics.

MAVRIC II is a mobile, autonomous robot whose brain is comprised almost entirely of artificial adaptrode‐based neurons. These neurons were previously shown to encode anticipatory actions. The architecture of this brain is based on the Extended Braitenberg Architecture (EBA). We are still in the process of collecting hard data on the behavioral traits of MAVRIC in the generalized foraging search task. But even now sufficient qualitative aspects of MAVRIC’s behavior have been garnered from foraging experiments to lend strong support to the theory that MAVRIC is a highly adaptive, life‐like agent. The development of the current MAVRIC brain has led to some important insights into the nature of intelligent control. In this paper we elucidate some of these principles in the form of lessons learned, and project the potential for future developments.

The late Stanley Kubrick's film 2001: A Space Odyssey portrayed a computer, HAL 9000, that appeared to be a conscious entity, especially given that it seemed capable of some forms of emotional expression. This article examines the film's portrayal of communication between HAL 9000 and the astronauts. Recent developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) (and synthetic emotions in particular) as well as social science research on human emotions are reviewed. Interpreting select scenes from 2001 in light of these findings, the authors argue that computer-generated emotions may be so realistic that they suggest inner feelings and consciousness. Refinements in AI technology are now making such realism possible. The need for a less anthropomorphic approach with computers that appear to have feelings is stressed.

Since the beginnings of computer technology, researchers have speculated about the possibility of building smart machines that could compete with human intelligence. Given the current pace of advances in artificial intelligence and neural computing, such an evolution seems to be a more concrete possibility. Many people now believe that artificial consciousness is possible and that, in the future, it will emerge in complex computing machines. However, a discussion of artificial consciousness gives rise to several philosophical issues: can computers think or do they just calculate? Is consciousness a human prerogative? Does consciousness depend on the material that comprises the human brain, or can computer hardware replicate consciousness? Answering these questions is difficult because it requires combining information from many disciplines including computer science, neurophysiology, philosophy, and religion. Further, we must consider the influence of science fiction, especially science fiction films, when addressing artificial consciousness. As a product of the human imagination, such works express human desires and fears about future technologies and may influence the course of progress. At a societal level, science fiction simulates future scenarios that can help prepare us for crucial transitions by predicting the consequences of significant technological advances. The paper considers robots in science fiction, the Turing test, computer chess and artificial consciousness.

The role of emotions has been underestimated in the field of robotics. We claim that emotions are relevant for the building of purposeful artificial systems from at least two perspectives: a cognitive and a phenomenological one. The cognitive aspect is relevant for at least two reasons. First, emotions could be the basis for binding between internal values and different external situations (the somatic marker theory). Second emotions could play a crucial role, during development, both for taking difficult decisions whose effects are not immediately verifiable and for the creation of more complex behavioral functions. Thus emotions can be seen, from a cognitive point of view, as a reinforcement stimulus and in this respect, they can be modeled in an artificial being. Inasmuch, emotions can be seen as a medium for linking rewards and values to external situations. From the phenomenological perspective, we accept the division between feelings and emotions. Emotions are, in James' words, the body theatre in which several emotions are represented and feelings are the mental phenomenological perception of them. We could say that feelings are the qualia of the body events we could call emotions. We are using this model of emotions in the development of our project: Babybot. We stress the importance of emotions during learning and development as endogenous teaching devices.

The aim of this chapter is to refine some questions regarding AI, and to provide partial answers to them. We analyze the state of the art in designing intelligent systems that are able to mimic human complex activities, including acts based on artificial consciousness. The analysis is performed to contrast the human cognition and behavior to the similar processes in AI systems. The analysis includes elements of psychology, sociology, and communication science related to humans and lower level beings. The second part of this chapter is devoted to human-human and man-machine communication, as related to intelligence. We emphasize that the relational aspects constitute the basis for the perception, knowledge, semiotic and communication processes. Several consequences are derived. Subsequently, we deal with the tools needed to endow the machines with intelligence. We discuss the roles of knowledge and data structures. The results could help building "sensitive and intelligent" machines.

The paper presents and defends the mimetic hypothesis concerning the origin of self-consciousness in three different kinds of development: hominid evolution, the mind of the child, and the epigenesis of mind within an artificial autonomous system - a robot. The proposed crucial factor for the emergence of self-consciousness is the ability to map between one's own subjective body-image and those of others, supported by a partially innate 'mirror system'. Combined with social interaction, this gives rise to inter-subjectivity and starts a developmental cycle of: 1) increased objectification of one's body-image, 2) increased volitional control, 3) increased understanding of the intentionality of others, and 4) increased understanding of one's own intentionality. The hypothesis has far reaching theoretical implications: the self-consciousness and empathy are co-determined; the language and tool-use are not causes, but rather consequences of increased self-consciousness; and most of the symptoms of autism can be accounted for as resulting from an impairment of the mirror system. The implications are negative for non-representational approaches to robotics and in favor of approaches based on imitation/mimesis.

Three fundamental questions concerning minds are presented. These are about consciousness, intentionality and intelligence. After we present the fundamental framework that has shaped both the philosophy of mind and the Artificial Intelligence research in the last forty years or so regarding the last two questions, we turn to consciousness, whose study still seems evasive to both communities. After briefly illustrating why and how phenomenal consciousness is puzzling, a theoretical diagnosis of the problem is proposed and a framework is presented, within which further research would yield a solution. The diagnosis is that the puzzle stems from a peculiar dual epistemic access to phenomenal aspects (qualia) of our conscious experiences. An account of concept formation is presented such that both the phenomenal concepts (like the concepts RED and SWEET) and the introspective concepts (like the concepts EXPERIENCING RED and TASTING SWEET) are acquired from a firstperson perspective as opposed to the third-person one (the standard concept formation strategy about objective features). We explain the first-person perspective in information-theoretic and computational terms: Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. (Hobbes 1651, p. 81) So declared Thomas Hobbes in 1651 in the Introduction to his well-known work, Leviathan, published one year after Réne Descartes' death. Descartes was also interested in mechanical explanations of bodily processes and organic life. In fact, on the basis of his neuroanatomical and physiological studies, as well as philosophical arguments, Descartes had already argued that human and animal bodies could be mechanically understood as complicated and intricately designed machines (Descartes 1664). What differentiated Descartes from Hobbes lay in his belief that human beings, unlike non-human animals, were not merely bodies; they were unions of material bodies and immaterial souls. The immaterial soul was necessary for Descartes to explain the peculiar capacities and activities of the human mind. As such, materialist mechanical explanations could never be sufficient to account for the whole human being.

Perception has both unconscious and conscious aspects. In all cases, however, what we perceive is a model of reality. By brain construction through evolution, we divide the world into two parts--our body and the outside world. But the process is the same in both cases. We perceive a construct usually governed by sensed data but always involving memory, goals, fears, expectations, etc. As a first step toward Artificial Perception in man-made systems, we examine perception in general here.

Conscious behavior is hypothesized to be governed by the dynamics of the neural architecture of the brain. A general model of an artificial consciousness algorithm is presented, and applied to a one-dimensional feedback control system. A new learning algorithm for learning functional relations is presented and shown to be biologically grounded. The consciousness algorithm uses predictive simulation and evaluation to let the example system relearn new internal and external models after it is damaged.

This paper investigates human consciousness in comparison with a robots' internal state. On the basis of Husserlian phenomenology, nine requirements for a model of consciousness are proposed from different technical aspects: self, intentionality, anticipation, feedback process, certainty, embodiment, otherness, emotionality and chaos. Consciousness-based Architecture (CBA) for mobile robots was analyzed in comparison with the requirements proposed for a consciousness model. CBA, previously developed, is a software architecture with an evolutionary hierarchy of the relationship between consciousness and behavior. Experiments with this architecture loaded on two mobile robots explain the emergence of self, and some of the intentionality, anticipation, feedback process, embodiment and emotionality. Modification of CBA will be necessary to better explain the emergence of self in terms of the relationship between consciousness and behavior.

This paper addresses the relationship of consciousness to artificial life set in the context of art. Artificial life is as much a part of our quest for self-definition as an instrument in the construction of reality. In exploring the technology of life we are exploring the possibilities of what we might become. In our hypermediated, telematic culture, the self acquires an essentially non-linear identity. Telepresence and virtual reality, the avatars of Net life, present us with a distributed, multiple identity which in turn is producing a radically new art. This embodies an ‘interstitial practice’ set within the domain of artificial life, and located at the intersections of cognitive science, bio-engineering, telematics and metaphysics. Can artists find in artificial life, nanotechnology, robotics and molecular engineering the means towards a re-materialization of art, after its postmodern, screen-based dematerialization? Just as ideas of the ‘immaterial’ have dominated art discourse for the last 15 years, so questions of emergent form, intelligent structures and artificial life are shaping a new discourse, from which art is moving off the screen and back into the material world. Will the real significance of art's re-materialization be at the level of mind? Will artificial life only gain cultural significance when it gives rise to artificial mind and the construction of consciousness?

Baars (1988, 1997) has proposed a psychological theory of consciousness, called global workspace theory. The present study describes a software agent implementation of that theory, called “Conscious” Mattie (CMattie). CMattie operates in a clerical domain from within a UNIX operating system, sending messages and interpreting messages in natural language that organize seminars at a university. CMattie fleshes out global workspace theory with a detailed computational model that integrates contemporary architectures in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Baars (1997) lists the psychological “facts that any complete theory of consciousness must explain” in his appendix to In the Theater of Consciousness; global workspace theory was designed to explain these “facts.” The present article discusses how the design of CMattie accounts for these facts and thereby the extent to which it implements global workspace theory.

Biosystems are unitary entities that are alive to some degree as a system. They occur at scales ranging from the molecular to the biospheric, and can be of natural, artificial or combined origin. The engineering of biosystems involves one or more of the activities of design, construction, operation, maintenance, repair, and upgrading. Engineering is usually done in order to achieve certain preconceived objectives by ensuring that the resultant systems possess particular features. This article concerns the engineering of biosystems so that they will be somewhat autonomous, or able to pursue their own goals in a dynamic environment. Central themes include: the computational abilities of a system; the virtual machinery, such as algorithms, that underlie these abilities (mind); and the actual computation that is performed (mentation). A significantly autonomous biosystem must be engineered to possess particular sets of computational abilities (faculties). These must be of sufficient sophistication (intelligence) to support the maintenance and use of a self-referencing internal model (consciousness), thereby increasing the potential for autonomy. Examples refer primarily to engineered ecosystems combined with technological control networks (ecocyborgs). The discussion is focused on clear working definitions of these concepts, and their integration into a coherent lexicon, which has been lacking until now, and the exposition of an accompanying philosophy that is relevant to the engineering of the virtual aspects of biosystems.